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Abstract: By challenging E. coli with sublethal norfloxacin for 10 days, Henry Lee and James 
Collins suggests the bacterial altruism leads to the population-wide resistance. By detailedly 
analyzing experiment data, we suggest that bacterial cooperation leads to population-wide 
resistance under norfloxacin pressure and simultaneously propose the bacteria shield is the 
possible feedback mechanism of less resistant bacteria. The bacteria shield is that the less resistant 
bacteria sacrifice the large number of themselves to consume norfloxacin and then to relieve the 
norfloxacin burden from highly resistant bacteria. Moreover, by employing Game Theory, the 
interaction between highly resistant bacteria and less resistant bacteria under norfloxacin can be 
considered as Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and the best strategy is to cooperate with each other, 
which agrees with bacterial cooperation achieved by analyzing experiment data. Thus, due to 
highly resistant bacteria and less resistant bacteria extracted from the same bacteria population, 
bacterial cooperation leads to heteroresistance. Additionally, the genetic relatedness of highly 
resistant bacteria and less resistant bacteria are very close, but the bacteria cooperate with each 
other, which provides a contradiction against Kin Selection Theory.   
 
Introduction 
The extensive and intensive employ of antibiotics for clinical, agricultural and 
pharmaceutical purpose is forming and transforming sublethal bactericide pressure toward bacteria, 
which triggers multidrug resistance via radical-induced mutagenesis [1]. Moreover, the 
susceptibility of bacteria to bactericides may not be uniform in the whole bacterial population.  
Some bacteria in a population may remain susceptible to the bactericide, whereas other bacteria 
display varying degrees of drug resistance, which is known as heteroresistance [1]. In fact, the 
bacteria with different resistance levels are genetically different [2].  
Henry Lee and James Collins challenged E.coli (MG 1665) by sublethal concentrations of 
norfloxacin and gentamicin and suggested that highly resistant isolates (HRIs) release signaling 
molecular, indole, to protect less resistant isolates (LRIs). Moreover, the protection provided by 
highly resistant isolates (HRIs) for less resistant isolates (LRIs) can be considered as the altruistic 
behaviors, which is known the form of kin selection [2,3]. However, the data mentioned by Lee at 
al might not suggest the major conclusion that HRIs is altruistic to LRIs under sublethal 
norfloxacin and gentamicin pressure, but support alterative and valid conclusion that HRIs and 
LRIs cooperate with each other under norfloxacin pressure [2,3].  
In this manuscript, we would like to illustrate bacterial cooperation leads to 
heteroresistance under sublethal norfloxacin pressure by analyzing experiment data and by 
employing Game Theory. Moreover, this case may be contradiction to Kin Selection Theory.  
 
The experiment data indicates that bacterial cooperation enhances population-wide 
resistance and bacteria shield is possible feedback mechanism of LRIs 
First, by detailedly analyzing Henry Lee and James Collins’s experiment data, the two 
major reasons for conclusion that HRIs and LRIs cooperate with each other is as follows.  
1. The abnormal changes of the proportion of HRIs and LRIs in co-culture 
The initial proportion of HRIs and LRIs is 1:100, but after 15-18 hours culture, the finial 
HRI-and-LRI ratio is 23:77. According to Table.1[5], if HRIs are altruistic to LRIs, the HRI-and-
LRI ratio could be less than 1:100, because HRIs cost their fitness to protect LRIs. Then, the 
possible final HRI-and-LRI ratio could be 1:100 or even 1:1000. Thus, this contradicts with the 
statement that HRIs is altruistic to LRIs.  
2. The abnormal changes of the population of HRIs and LRIs in the isolation and co-
culture. 
All norfloxacin concentrations are 1500 ng/ml. All colonies are cultured overnight (15-18 
hours) and all initial populations of bacteria are 108 cfu/ml, for both isolation and co-culture. In 
the isolation, only HRIs or LRIs is cultured. In the co-culture, the initial ratio HRI-to-LRI ratio is 
1:100 (1 in 100). Namely, the initial populations of HRLs and LRIs are 105cfu/ml and 107cfu/ml.  
2.1.The analysis for LRIs in the isolation and co-culture 
In the isolation, under the norfloxacin pressure, the population of LRIs changes from 
108cfu/ml to 102cfu/ml, which lowers 106 times. In co-culture, the population of LRIs changes 
from 107cfu/ml to 104cfl/ml, which lowers 103 times. This indicates that the existence of HRIs 
improves the survival of the LRIs in co-culture, which coincides with Lee’s conclusion.  
2.2.The analysis for HRIs in the isolation and co-culture 
In the isolation, under then norfloxacin concentration 1500 ng/ml, the population of HRIs 
changes from 108cfu/ml to 104cfu/ml, which lowers 104 times. In co-culture, the population of 
HRIs changes from 105cfu/ml to 104cfu/ml, which lowers 101 times. This indicates that the 
existence of LRIs improves the survival of the HRIs under norfloxacin pressure, although it 
maybe contradicts against common sense. Moreover, this conclusion challenges the Lee’s 
result. 
Here, according to Table 1 [5], it is easy to arrive that HRIs and LRIs cooperate with 
each other under norfloxacin pressure. Meanwhile, by comparing with the LRIs populations in 
the isolate and co-culture, the LRIs sacrifice the large number of themselves to protect HRIs in co-
culture. Namely, the feedback mechanism of LRIs could be considered as “the bacteria shield” 
for the HRIs under norfloxacin pressure.  Moreover, because the HRIs and LRIs are extracted from 
the same bacteria population challenged by norfloxacin for 10 days and exhibiting high levels of 
resistant heterogeneity, the cooperation among subpopulations in bacteria can be a valid 
mechanism for heteroresistance. 
Table 1. A classification of social behaviors [5] 
 
 
Effect on recipient 
Positive Negative 
Effect on 
actor 
Positive Mutual benefit 
(Cooperation) 
Selfishness 
Negative Altruism Spite 
 
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests mutual cooperation is the best strategy for Highly 
Resistant Isolates and Less Resistant Isolates under norfloxacin pressure.  
In the section, we would like first to introduce several essential concepts for following 
analysis. The definition of Prisoner’s Dilemma, Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Cooperation, 
Altruism and Kin Selection Theory.   
Prisoner’s Dilemma represents two members of a criminal gang are arrested and 
imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of communicating with the 
other. The prosecutors lack sufficient evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. They 
hope to get both sentenced to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the prosecutors 
offer each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner is given the opportunity either to: betray (defect) the 
other by testifying that the other committed the crime, or to cooperate with the other by remaining 
silent. The offer is: 
a) If A and B each betray the other, each of them serves 2 years in prison; 
b) If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve 3 years in prison 
(and vice versa); 
c) If A and B both remain silent, both of them will only serve 1 year in prison (on the lesser 
charge).  
Thus, in this case, the best strategy for each player is mutual defection [4].  
The conditions of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma are exactly same with those of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, but the game round is many times (repeated/ iterated), rather than once.  In this case, 
the best strategy for each player is tit for tat. Namely, mutual defection and cooperation are the 
best strategy. Thus, cooperation can be formed [4]. 
Cooperation is a form of working together in which one individual pays a cost and another 
gains a benefit [4]. Altruism is the behavior that reduces fitness of actors and their offspring but 
efficiently increases fitness of recipients and their offspring [4]. Kin-selection theory suggests that 
the more similar genetic relatedness between actors and recipients, the more possible altruistic 
behaviors occur from actors to recipients [4].  
From the perspective to Game Theory, we consider highly resistant isolates (HRIs) and 
less resistant isolates (LRIs) are considered as two prisoners. Moreover, norfloxacin pressure is 
regarded as offer provided by prosecutors. Because the generation time of E.coli is approximately 
30 minutes, the culture time 15-18 hours can be considered as iterated game rounds and long-time 
evolution. According to Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [4], the best strategy for both highly resistant 
isolates (HRIs) and less resistant isolates (LRIs) is to cooperate with each other, which coincides 
with the bacterial cooperation achieved by analyzing experiment data. 
Moreover, by employing whole-genome sequence, Henry Lee and James J Collins show 
that LRIs and HRIs are very genetically closed. According to Kin Selection Theory, HRIs is 
supposed to be altruistic to LRIs or vice versa, which agrees with Henry Lee and James J Collins’ 
conclusion. However, due to bacterial cooperation achieved by analyzing experiment data and 
employing Game Theory, particularly Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Kin Selection Theory and its 
corresponding conclusion that bacterial altruism leads to population-wide resistance may not hold. 
 
Conclusion 
In this manuscript, we suggest that bacterial cooperation leads to population-wide 
resistance under norfloxacin pressure and simultaneously propose the bacteria shield is the 
possible feedback mechanism of less resistant bacteria. The bacteria shield is that the less resistant 
bacteria sacrifice the large number of themselves to consume norfloxacin and then to relieve the 
bactericide burden from highly resistant bacteria. Moreover, by employing Game Theory, the 
interaction between highly resistant bacteria and less resistant bacteria under norfloxacin can be 
considered as Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and the best strategy is to cooperate with each other, 
which agrees with bacterial cooperation achieved by analyzing experiment data. Thus, due to 
highly resistant bacteria and less resistant bacteria extracted from the same bacteria population, 
bacterial cooperation leads to heteroresistance. Additionally, the genetic relatedness of highly 
resistant bacteria and less resistant bacteria are very close, but the bacteria cooperate with each 
other, which provides a contradiction against Kin Selection Theory. 
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